Claim of Relational Right of Privacy Denied by unknown
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 12 
Number 1 Volume 12, Winter 1966, Number 1 Article 12 
November 2016 
Claim of Relational Right of Privacy Denied 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
Recommended Citation 
(1966) "Claim of Relational Right of Privacy Denied," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 12 : No. 1 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol12/iss1/12 
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
the Court, in affirming, might very well
expand on its decision in Torcaso, and
might outlaw religious tests not only for
public officials but also for jurors and
witnesses. Such a decision, establishing a
national standard, would prevent state de-
cisions from remaining as controlling
authority.
Claim of Relational Right of
Privacy Denied
The widow and son of Alphonse (Al)
Capone and the administratrix of his
estate brought an action against the pro-
ducers, the sponsor and the broadcasting
company which telecast several programs
purportedly based on the life of the de-
ceased. The estate claimed a property
right in the name, likeness and personality
of Capone, while the wife and son asserted
an invasion of their right of privacy, even
though they were not mentioned in the
telecast. In affirming the decision of the
district court, the United States Court of
Appeals held that the estate had no pro-
tectible property right in the name, and,
that under Illinois law, living relatives of
a decedent are not entitled to recover
under a "relational right" of privacy.
Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d
418 (7th Cir. 1965).
Although the right of privacy is now
recognized and protected,' it has been held
1 See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right
of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); The
Right of Privacy, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 335 (1965).
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The fact that the Maryland provision
remained in effect for so long is indicative
of how religious beliefs are used to judge
a man's qualifications for public service.
The courts should be quick to assert that
religion is not an acceptable standard by
which the state should judge a man's
capacity.
that a deceased person has no such right.2
However, there is some conflict 3 as to
whether there exists a "relational right"
of privacy, i.e., a right of the living rela-
tives of the decedent to be protected from
unwarranted publications or disclosures
concerning the deceased person's life. The
prevailing opinion is that the right of
privacy is personal, not relational, and
that it does not survive the decedent. 4
This conclusion follows from the failure
of the courts to recognize a right of privacy
when the party claiming the right is not
mentioned in the course of the alleged
invasion, 5 and from the historical policy
against survival of defamation actions.6
2 Ravellette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854, 857 (7th
Cir. 1962); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434,
447, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (1895).
Compare Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. Rep.
2d 315, 322-23, 239 P.2d 876, 881 (1952),
with Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So.
2d 118, 121 (1948).
4 E.g., Coversone v. Davies, 38 Cal. Rep. 2d
315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952); Bradley v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168
N.E.2d 64 (1960).
5Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., supra
note 4.
6 See Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L.
REV. 237, 247-48 (1932).
RECENT DECISIONS
Most of the early "relational rights"
cases, wherein the courts denied recovery
for invasion of privacy, were brought
primarily on the theory of injury to feel-
ings. Thus, in Schuyler v. Curtis,' rela-
tives of a deceased woman sought to en-
join the erection of a statue of the de-
ceased by which the defendants intended
to honor her as a philanthropist. The
court decided that erection of such a
statue provided no plausible grounds to
the relatives for injured feelings, and thus,
the facts were not sufficient to constitute
an invasion of their privacy. However,
the court did not deny that there could
be a "relational right" if the proper
grounds existed. "[O]ur decision furnishes
. . . not the slightest occasion for the
belief that under it the feelings of rela-
tives or friends may be outraged or the
memory of a deceased person degraded
with impunity, by any person ... "I'
Where, in addition to injured feelings,
there was evidence of commercial ex-
ploitation, some courts have recognized
the possibility of recovery. Thus, where
a hospital permitted a newspaper to take
unauthorized photographs of a deformed
infant's corpse, it was held that the par-
ents had a valid cause of action.9 Likewise,
where a photographer was employed to
take a dozen photographs of the corpses
of Siamese twins, and where additional
147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895).
8 Id. at 452, 42 N.E. at 27.
9 Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257,
155 S.E. 194 (1930). Although this case con-
stitutes only slight authority for recognition of
a "relational right" of privacy, since it involved
violation of a confidential relationship, it none-
theless recognizes that there can be an invasion
of privacy when the wrongful act is directed
at a deceased person.
copies were made and copyrighted, an
action by the parents for invasion of their
right of privacy and breach of a confiden-
tial relationship was sustained.1" Although
in both of these cases the courts relied
on the relational interest that parents have
in their children, their arguments were
reinforced by the evidence that confiden-
tial relationships had been violated. Thus,
in circumstances where there existed both
commercial exploitation and the violation
of surviving relatives' rights, the courts
were willing to grant recovery.
An examination of statutory develop-
ment in this area discloses that only four
states presently protect the right of pri-
vacy, and then, only when there has been
commercial exploitation." Of the four
states, only New York restricts its pro-
tection to living persons. 12 The remaining
three states afford some protection to the
next of kin ("relational right") where
there has been an appropriation of the
decedent's name. In a Utah decision, 13
the widow and daughter of an entertainer
sought to enjoin the exhibition of a motion
picture which fictionalized incidents in his
life. The court held that the statute was
applicable only where the violation con-
stituted actual advertising or the promo-
tion of a collateral commodity (a product
using the name of the decedent), and did
not extend to a semi-fictional portrayal
of a person's life in a motion picture. In
1ODouglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W.
849 (1912).
''N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839 (1958); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-4-8 (1953), § 76-4-9 (Supp. 1963);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
12 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50.
13 Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib.
Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954).
balancing the rights of the individual
against public policy, the court noted:
Where the right of privacy of the indi-
vidual is pitted against the general weal,
we give some consideration to the precept
that the best social policy is that which
results in the greatest good to the greatest
number, unless application of this principle
cuts into inviolable rights of the indi-
vidual.
14
Thus, in adopting a utilitarian approach,
the court construed the statute very nar-
rowly, giving motion picture makers wide
latitude in fictionalizing biographies of
deceased persons.
The defenses traditionally applicable to
a right of privacy action can also be
asserted in an action based on a "rela-
tional right." Where an event is news-
worthy, the mass media are privileged to
report it under the first amendment guar-
antee of freedom of the press.15 Also,
when a person becomes a public figure,
he relinquishes a part of his right of
privacy, as the public has a justifiable
interest in the notorious events of life. 16
For example, in Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner,17 a widower sued a newspaper
which published a story and picture of
his wife's suicide leap from a building.
He based his action on the theory of an
invasion of his "relational right" of pri-
vacy. The court denied recovery because
the wife's suicide was a newsworthy matter
14 Id. at 264, 272 P.2d at 183.
'1 See, e.g., Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496,
83 So. 2d 235 (1955); Waters v. Fleetwood,
212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
16 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1941); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37
So. 2d 118 (1948).
17 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
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which made her a public figure, and, thus,
not the subject of a right of privacy.
In the instant case, the appellate tri-
bunal affirmed the lower court's rejec-
tion of the plaintiff's claim of injury to a
property right, and agreed that the extent
of the relief sought was for an alleged
invasion of a right of privacy. In doing
so, it dismissed the plaintiff's analogy to
the "dead body cases," wherein courts
have granted relief for an invasion of the
right to bury the remains of a deceased
relative.
After stating that, under Illinois deci-
sional law, the right of privacy was per-
sonal, and that in order to prevail the
plaintiff must prove invasion of his own
right of privacy, the Court observed that
"it is anomalous to speak of the privacy
of a deceased person. . . . Comment,
fictionalization and even distortion of a
dead man's career do not invade the
privacy of his offspring. .. ."Is However,
it should be noted that the concurring
opinion disagreed on this latter point, and
expressed the conviction that the right of
privacy of the deceased's widow and son
had indeed been invaded. Moreover, the
concurring judge stated his belief that the
lives of the widow and son were shattered
after the television series began. He noted
that the son's children were ridiculed so
incessantly that their father found it neces-
sary to remove them from school, to sell
his home and restaurant business, to
change his name and to move to another
city. Nonetheless, while expressing his
abhorrence of the fictionalization of
Capone's career, the concurring judge
's Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d
418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965).
RECENT DECISIONS
agreed with the majority that, under Illi-
nois law, there was no available remedy.
The lower court had also found that a
wrong had been committed, and that a
remedy should have been available for
these plaintiffs, although one was lacking
under present law.19
The instant case indicates the harshness
of the present status of the law in the
area of the right of privacy, under which
relief cannot be granted for the invasion
of a "relational right" of privacy. The
traditional restrictions endure: unless a
plaintiff can prove that he was specifically
mentioned or portrayed, he will remain
without a remedy when only his relative's
name is appropriated.
While there is some conflicting opinion
in the area, most authorities are in accord
that a "relational right" of privacy should
be recognized by the courts.20 One argu-
ment is that since the interest one has in
his relationship with a deceased member
of the family has received protection
against physical appropriation, there is no
reason why such protection should not
be given to intangible appropriation, espe-
cially where it is of the commercial type.
The law has progressed from protection
of the physical person to protection of
reputation and sensibilities. It is no greater
transition from protection of a dead body
to protection of the reputation and mem-
ory of a departed relative. Nor are the
1. Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 230 F. Supp.
721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
20See Gordon, Right of Property in Name,
Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U.
L. REV. 553, 594-605 (1960); Green, Relational
Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 485-90 (1934);
Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's
Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 553-56
(1941).
sensibilities of the living concerning their
departed kin to be ignored. Judicial re-
cognition of the fact that one's own pri-
vacy may be invaded by unauthorized use
of the name or picture of a deceased
member of his family is a step forward in
the historical tradition of the common
law.2'
The "relational right" of privacy may
also be analogized to "defamation by asso-
ciation." A publication may defame a
person even though, on its face, it makes
no direct reference to him. The reference
may be indirect, with the identification
depending upon circumstances known to
the hearers. It is not necessary that every
listener understand the significance of the
utterance, so long as there are some who
reasonably understand its defamatory
meaning.22
To some extent, at least, this theory
appears applicable to the circumstances
of the instant case. While there may have
been no specific reference to the indi-
viduals alleging an invasion of their pri-
vacy, there was, nonetheless, an unfortun-
ate association in the minds of friends and
neighbors between them and the person-
ality which was appropriated and ficti-
tiously portrayed. Consequently, it might
be argued that the invasion of Al Capone's
privacy and the damages suffered by his
relatives are facts sufficient to state a
cause of action-an "invasion by associ-
ation."
The case against the recognition of such
a "relational right" hinges on the conten-
tion that it would open the floodgates to
litigation. Since special damages need not
be shown in invasion of privacy cases,
21 Nizer, supra note 20, at 556.
22 See GREGORY & KALVEN, TORTS 968-73
(1959).
every relative, no matter how distant,
might claim that his rights had been in-
vaded. 3 However, it should not be over-
looked that the courts are daily confronted
with similar problems in those libel cases
where special damages need not be
alleged; and certainly in the libel area this
problem has never been regarded as a
serious obstacle to recovery.
Since most courts have thus far refused
to break precedent and recognize a "rela-
tional right" of privacy, legislative action
is required. If Oklahoma and Virginia,
whose statutes are similar to that of Utah,
should adopt the same narrow construc-
tion of "commercial exploitation" accepted
in that jurisdiction, then it will be appar-
ent that this type of statutory protection
is not completely effective. A well drafted
statute should protect against any invasion
of a deceased person's memory, and
should extend beyond protection from
mere promotion of collateral commodities
which capitalizes on the name or person-
ality of a decedent. It should, in fact,
proscribe all commercial exploitation of
the decedent's name, personality and like-
ness whenever the publication is primarily
fictional or for entertainment and amuse-
23 "Every defamation, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution would then be an action-
able invasion of the privacy of the relatives
of the victim." Coverstone v. Davies, supra
note 3.
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ment, as distinguished from a publication
primarily historical, and, thus, intended
for the education or information of the
public. 2 4
In failing to overcome the inertia of the
law, this decision has highlighted the in-
jury to relatives that can result from un-
restricted commercial exploitation of a
deceased person's name and personality.
It is apparent that in this age of modern
news media, the typical invasion of pri-
vacy by network telecasting will involve
most of the fifty states. Consequently,
either a federal or a uniform state statute
is required to provide the necessary pro-
tection. In view of the likelihood of in-
creased judicial and legislative acceptance
of the right of privacy, and because of the
growing need for controlling the exploitive
tendencies of radio and television, such
legislation may well be forthcoming.
24 A uniform right of privacy act has been
proposed in Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48
Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 734, 764 (1948): "Any person, firm
or corporation that interferes with any living
person, or with a deceased's memory, by in-
truding, in any unreasonable and serious man-
ner upon the private activities of the living,
or by making known in like manner the private
affairs of any one, living or deceased, or by
exposing such person to the public by substan-
tial use of his name, portrait, picture, likeness
or by other means sufficient to identify him,
shall be liable for invasion of his privacy ..
(Emphasis added.)
